THE DEITY'S DELAY

In PUNISHING the

GUILTY,

CONSIDERED,

ON THE

Principles of REASON.

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THE PREFACE.

THE progreſs of Vice among us hath, of late, ſhewn itſelf in ſuch very miſchievous effects, that how it may be remedy'd cannot but be every one's concern, who at all regards the public intereſt.

What ſhall be, in any conſiderable degree, a remedy for ſo great an evil, muſt come from the interpoſition of the legiſlature; and this we are encourag'd to expect.

It may not, in the mean time, be improper to obſerve, how very little

the generality of our penal laws avail us.

There is ſcarce a diverſion that can corrupt our morals, nor a crime that ſeems likely to affect the common ſafety, againſt which the legiſlature hath not already provided by ſome or other puniſhment. Notwithſtanding which, moſt of theſe diverſions are as publicly taken, and moſt of theſe crimes as frequently committed, as if they were not at all under the Magiſtrate's cogniſance.

How juſt ſoever the complaint may be of the multitude of our Statutes, All appear agreed that there is one *ſtill wanting*—One *to put many of thoſe we have in force.*

To what ſuch a contempt of the laws is owing, what danger it indicates, and what notice, therefore, it deſerves, our Superiors are beſt qualified to determine.

While they are conſidering how a Reformation *may be advanc'd by their* Power,

Power, *we, in a lower ſtation, cannot be more becomingly employ'd, than in uſing our endeavours to promote it by our* Reaſoning. *Whatever we contribute to remove the bad* Principles *ſo unhappily ſpread throughout the Nation, we ſo far aſſiſt towards correcting its* Manners.

That noble Line of Racine, *to which his countrymen gave ſo loud and juſt an applauſe,*

Je crains Dieu —— & n'ai point
d'autre crainte.

Athal. *Ac.* 1. *Sc.* 1.

May be as pertinently apply'd to a Nation, as to any particular perſon.

Certainly, did the fear of God influence us, there would be an end of the diſorders from which we have ſo much to fear; we ſhould have nothing to fear either among ourſelves, or from our moſt powerful neighbours.

What

What the guilty have to apprehend from the Deity, how unsafe they are, notwithstanding any impunity they may be now thought to enjoy, will, it is hoped, appear in the following sheets. If what is said in them should prove the means of reclaiming any one vitious person, the author will think his pains well bestow'd; as the best wish he has to make for himself on this side the grave, is, that he may be instrumental in promoting the cause of true Religion and Virtue.

ERRATA.

In the text.

P. 21. l. 24. after *restore* add *it*.
P. 25. l. 21. for *imitate* r. *animate*.
P. 33. l. 11. for *convictions* r. *corrections*.

In the notes.

P. 30. l. 1. *qu in, si nocntes* l. *quin, si nocentes*.
P. 50. l. 12. ἄλλα l. ἄλλο.
Ib. l. 13. ταξιν, πολι &c. l. τάξιν. Apol. Soc. Πολὺ &c. Ib.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION.

THERE is perhaps ſcarce any thing in our frame more ſurpriſing, more difficult to be accounted for, than that we ſhould have ſo ſtrong a ſenſe of the excellency of Virtue*, and yet be ſo indiſpos'd to its purſuit—than that we ſhould give ſo diſtinguiſh'd a place in our eſteem, to what has ſuch ſlight influence on our practice.

* Adeo gratioſa virtus eſt, ut inſitum ſit etiam malis, probare meliora. *Sen. de Benef.*

Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat. *Sen. Ep.* 74.

Neminem malum eſſe, niſi ſtultum eumdem, non modo a ſapientibus dicitur, ſed vulgo quoque ſemper eſt creditum. *Quinct.*

Natura nos ad mentem optimam genuit: adeoque diſcere meliora volentibus promptum eſt, ut vere intuenti mirum ſit illud magis, malos eſſe tam multos. *Quinct.*

We honour worth in others*, we are greatly pleas'd with it in ourſelves.—We hear and read of virtuous actions with the higheſt approbation of them.—Whatever we do rightly, we find always ſatisfaction in doing it†, and the review of it, when done, fails not to delight us‖; yet is there nothing of this nature that can keep us ſteady to our Duty; we violate it under the cleareſt ſight of all its recommendations, and notwithſtanding our plaineſt diſcernment of the many happy effects which a due regard to it would produce.

That the ſolicitations of the inferior principles in our conſtitution ſhould induce any of us to act ſo contrary to our manifeſt

* Nihil eſt virtute amabilius, quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur. *Tull. de Nat. Deor.*

Οὐ γὰρ ὅσον ὑσίας ἀρεσῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ, τοσῦτον καὶ τῦ κρίνειν τὰς ἄλλας οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι· θεῖον δέ τι καὶ ἔυσοχον ἐσὶ καὶ τοῖσι κακοῖς. ὥστε πάμπολλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν ἓν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιρῦνται τὰς ἀμείνυς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς χείρυς. *Plato de Leg.* l. 12.

† Τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀρεσὴν φιλοπονεῖν, καὶ σοφρόνως τὸν ἑαυτῦ βίον ὀικονομεῖν, ἀεὶ τὰς τέρψεις εἰλικρινεῖς καὶ βεβαιοτέρας ἀποδίδωσι. *Isoc. ad Nic.*

‖ ——Moneo vos ego hæc, qui eſtis boni,
Quique ætatem agitis cum pietate & cum fide,
Retinete porro: poſt factum ut lætemini.
Plaut.

intereſt,

intereſt, may well aſtoniſh us; yet that they have generally this fatal aſcendency over us, is but too evident: Who, alas! among us, is not ready to acknowledge it to be his own ſad caſe?

And as Appetite and Paſſion have ſuch power to leſſen in our eſteem the greateſt benefit that can be propos'd to us from their reſtraint—as they can ſo far influence us, that their gratification ſhall be judg'd preferable to the moſt ſolid advantage which Reaſon has to offer us; they are alike able to divert our attention from any diſtreſs that may be apprehended if we give way to them, to take off from the formidable appearance of any evil that may thence accrue to us*: they are able either to hinder our thinking at all of any miſchief that can enſue from indulging them, or to perſuade us that ſuch miſchief may be eaſily eſcap'd, or will, if ſuffer'd, be very inconſiderable in

* Ut ſit magna, tamen certe lenta ira Deorum eſt.
Si curant igitur cunctos punire nocentes,
Quando ad me venient? Sed & exorabile Numen
Fortaſſe experiar: Solet his ignoſcere. Multi
Committunt eadem diverſo crimina fato.
Ille crucem pretium ſceleris tulit, hic diadema.
Sic animum diræ trepidum formidine culpæ
Confirmant. *Juvenal.*

compariſon of the enjoyments that preceed it.

Tell him who is intent on pleaſing his palate, how dear it will coſt him, what a ſad reckoning there muſt be for thoſe morſels, the reliſh of which is gone the moment they are ſwallow'd——how ſoon they will become offenſive to his ſtomach, and bring it to nauſeate the moſt wholeſom food—— what extreamly painful diſeaſes are deriv'd from them, how utterly hopeleſs the cure of thoſe diſtempers is, and for what a length of time he may continue tormented by them: Let all this be fully repreſented to him—let the ſad deſcription be as lively as the wit of man can make it; you are ſure to ſpeak in vain; the evil that will not be immediately felt, is utterly diſregarded. While the ſufferings you denounce are at a diſtance, whatever you can ſay of them ſhall not diſſuade from the practice, of which they are ſure to be the conſequence.

This diſpoſition in us to put nothing into the ballance againſt preſent pleaſure, but pain inſtantly following it—this unhappy proneneſs in us to give our vicious inclinations their ſcope, when the miſchievous effects of it do not immediately diſcover them-

themſelves*, might be ſhewn in a great variety of other inſtances; but as few will think a fuller proof thereof wanted, I will proceed to the point which is by ſo many thought a much leſs clear one, and endeavour to evince, how unreaſonably we allow ourſelves in any guilty practice, becauſe it is leſs ſpeedily puniſh'd. For which purpoſe I ſhall ſhew, that God's delay in giving our crimes their due puniſhment, affords no juſt ground to ſuppoſe that they never will receive it. And this, I think, muſt be admitted, if it can be made evident,

Firſt, That Guilt deſerves puniſhment:

Secondly, That the Deity may be regarded as moſt fitly puniſhing it:

Thirdly, That in many caſes the Deity inconteſtably proves his diſpleaſure at our Guilt by the ſuffering which he has made its immediate attendant:

Fourthly, That there are many obvious reaſons, why the full puniſhment de-

* Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα δή που, ταῦτα ἢ αὐτὰ τῆς κακῆς εἰκός ἐστιν ἑαυτοῖς διακελευομένους καὶ παρεγγυῶντας, ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς παρανομήμασιν, ὡς τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν μὲν καρπὸν εὐθὺς ὡραῖον καὶ πρῶτον ἀποδιδούσης, τὴν δὲ τιμωρίαν ὀψὲ καὶ πολὺ τῆς ἀπολαύσεως καθυστεροῦσαν. *Plut. de his qui ſero, &c.*

ſerv'd by the guilty ſhould not be immediately inflicted:

Fifthly, That God has afforded us many proofs, in this world, how wrong it is to perſuade ourſelves that we ſhall wholly eſcape the puniſhment which is ſlow in coming upon us, or, how long puniſhment may be delay'd, and yet be finally inflicted.

SECTION I.

*FIRST**, Let it be conſider'd that Guilt deſerves puniſhment.

By moral writers *Puniſhment* is conſider'd as a branch of Juſtice. Tho' they may have diſputed, whether *it* be reducible to that ſpecies of Juſtice which regulates exchanges †, or, whether *it* more properly belong

* Τί δῆτα, ἄνθρωπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἦλθε τινὸς ἥκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα, ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν, ἃ δεῖ διδόναι δίκην; *Plat. Euthyph.*

Οὕτω γε πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν. *Plat. Amat.*

† An ad aſſignatricem, an vero ad expletricem Juſtitiam pœna pertineat, diverſi diverſum ſentiunt.——

Verum

belong not to that which proportions recompence †; or, whether *it* be not of a kind diſtinct from either of theſe ‖; they are, however, agreed, that it appertains to the Virtue which gives to each his due—— that where Juſtice takes place, Guilt will be puniſh'd.

THERE is not the ſingle perſon, who, when wrong'd by another, does not think that he, who has thus wrong'd him, might *deſervedly* ſuffer for it. Bear we may with an injury done us, and readily forgive it; but they who are of the moſt placable and forgiving temper will yet acknowledge the

Verum eſt in pœnis primo ac per ſe exerceri expletricem Juſtitiam (quam vulgo commutatricem vocant) quia ſcilicet qui punit, ut recte puniat, jus habere debet ad puniendum, quod jus ex delicto nocentis naſcitur. *Grot. de Jure Bel. ac Pac.*

† Juſtitia diſtributiva reſpicit ἀξίαν, quod quiſque meretur, quod cuique convenit, ſive id præmium ſit, ſive pœna.——In delictis coercendis pœnarumque irrogatione modo arithmetica, modo geometrica proportio ſervatur; quod totum eſt Juſtitiæ diſtributricis. *Vin. in Inſtitut.*

‖ Inter Philoſophos diſceptatum, ad quamnam Juſtitiæ ſpeciem pœnarum impoſitio pertineret, ad commutativam, an diſtributivam. ——Dicimus ad neutram juſtitiæ ſpeciem pœnas pertinere; ſed eaſdem peculiari ſpecie juſtitiæ temperari. *Puffendorf. de Jur. Nat.*

Guilt contracted by the injurious perſon, and how *juſt* it would be if he were to ſuffer in proportion to the wrong done by him.

THE Laws of *all* ſocieties agree in puniſhing various kinds of Guilt. Nor do the Laws of the *more civiliſ'd and better policy'd nations* puniſh only the crimes which immediately affect the public welfare, but, likewiſe, ſuch as have a remoter influence upon it; and thus they animadvert upon ſeveral of thoſe offences which directly regard our duty to God and ourſelves. What is not in theſe nations, puniſh'd by an expreſs Law, is ſo by other methods——by the ſuſpicions entertain'd of the offender——by reproaching him——* by not crediting him——by giving readily into the belief of all unfavourable reports of him——by conniving at the inſults offer'd him.

FURTHER, when the criminal ſuffers the puniſhment that the Law appoints him, he owns the juſtice of it. Wrongfully accus'd, he may lament his miſhap; as he alſo may do, when rigorouſly proſecuted; but ſup-

* Εἰ γὰρ ὅτιδε, ἀποκτείναντες ἀνθρώπους, ἐπισχήσειν τὸ ἐνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διαγοεῖσθε. *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

poſing

posing the accusation of him a just one, and only the customary methods pursu'd in convicting him, he objects not to what he has to suffer as undeserv'd by him——as an injury done him——as an hard treatment of him.

AGAIN, there is, perhaps, nothing that we call a crime, but what every prudent person animadverts upon in those he best loves, in his Children: he shews his sense of its desert by the correction he gives them, or the anger he expresses towards them for it.

To add no more on this head; It is evident to all, that if each were at liberty to act as he pleas'd, there could be no society * ——there could be no order or peace in the world——no one could live in any manner of security——we all, like beasts of prey, should be let loose upon one another, and be so much more capable to hurt each other than any of the brute kind are, as our active powers so far exceed theirs. Since then an universal confusion must follow if mens actions were under no restraint; it must be just to restrain them, and, therefore, to pu-

* Ita probanda est mansuetudo, atque clementia, ut adhibeatur, reipublicæ causa, severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest. *Tull. de Off.*

nish

niſh ſuch of them as tend to introduce this confuſion *.

GUILT may thus be conſider'd as juſtly deſerving puniſhment.

SECTION II.

SECONDLY, The Deity may be regarded as moſt fitly puniſhing it.

THE impious, in every age, ſcruple not to acknowledge it as one chief cauſe of their impiety, That the worſt of men often paſs their days in ſo much ſafety — proceed from youth to age in a courſe of villany, frequently quite unhurt, and, ſometimes, greatly proſperous. This, it is objected, could never be, were the world under a juſt and wiſe government †. The confeſſion, therefore, of

* Ut enim nec Domus, nec Reſpublica ratione quadam, & diſciplina deſignata videatur, ſi in ea nec recte factis præmia extent ulla, nec ſupplicia peccatis: ſic mundi divina in homines moderatio, profecto nulla eſt, ſi in ea diſcrimen nullum eſt bonorum & malorum. *Tull. de Nat. Deor.*

Ubi diſcrimen inter malos bonoſque ſublatum eſt, confuſio ſequitur. *Sen. de Clem.*

† — Non hominem Diis curæ, ideo creberrima & triſtia in bonos, læta apud deteriores eſſe. *Tacitus An.*

Impro-

of the Atheiſt himſelf is, that Guilt, if there was a Deity, would certainly be puniſh'd by him.

The thing, indeed, ſpeaks itſelf. Whatever is contrary to the good of the World muſt properly fall under the notice of the *Governor* of it, demands to be reform'd or reſtrain'd by *him*; and the oppoſition of rational Beings to the common good *is* fitly prevented or controul'd by what ſuch of them, whoſe actions are prejudicial to the general welfare, will be ſure to ſuffer from *him**. The very utmoſt that can be done by any of our own ſpecies—all the proviſion they can make for the common intereſt, will, neceſſarily, go but a little way towards

Improborum proſperitates, ſecundæque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem Deorum, ac poteſtatem. *Tul. de Nat. Deor.*

Συμβαίνει δέ τινας—διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εὐροοῦντας, ὀλιγωρεῖν ὧν ἔχουσι προλήψεων, καὶ χώραν διδόναι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγειν,

Τολμῶ κατειπεῖν, μήποτ' οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες ἐπιπλήττουσί με.

Simp. in Epic.

* Acerbitas plerumque ulciſcendi maleficii bene atque caute vivendi diſciplina eſt. *Aul. Gel.*

Bonis nocet quiſquis pepercerit malis. *Pub. Syr.*

Tam omnibus ignoſcere crudelitas eſt, quam nulli. *Sen. de Clem.*

its

its ſecurity. What, therefore, is more reaſonably apprehended, than that their inability herein ſhould be ſupply'd by the interpoſition of the ſupream ruler—that where their power fails, his ſhould be exerted?

BESIDES as the ſame *action* may be attended, in different perſons, with very different degrees of guilt, utterly impenetrable to human diſcernment; and can have, therefore, by human laws no ſeverer puniſhment appointed for *it*, when under the higheſt degree of guilt, than is deſerv'd by *it* when under a much leſs; the full deſert of it can only be receiv'd from him to whom nothing is ſecret, and whoſe obſervation is no more to be eſcap'd, than his force is to be reſiſted.

FURTHER, Nothing can be more probable, than that he who made us what we are, muſt require from us a courſe of action conformable to our nature, and to the faculties he has given us; and that he muſt be diſpleas'd when thoſe faculties are abus'd or neglected—when we regard not our nature—when we act in contradiction to it—when we wilfully diſorder and impair our frame, haſten its diſſolution, diſqualify it for

its

its nobleſt offices, debaſe the ſuperior principle within us, nor only decline the advantages it might yield us, and deny it the improvement for which it is fitted, but render it inſtrumental to our own groſſeſt corruption, and to the more extenſive hurt of our fellow-creatures.

If it be juſt to conceive the Deity offended when we thus conduct ourſelves, we muſt conſider ſuch diſpleaſure fitly appearing in the ſufferings it occaſions us.

Nor can it be ſaid, either

That the Loſs of the advantages which a better care of ourſelves would have procur'd us, is an adequate puniſhment for omitting this care, or, That by ſhortning our Lives we dearly pay for our exceſſes—for ſubjecting our reaſon to our appetite or paſſion.

As to the former, it is notorious that we may become ſuch very brutes, as to be pleas'd with our brutality *——to think the enjoyments of animal life the moſt deſireable, and to have no reliſh or notion of any other.

* Tam bonis quam malis voluptas ineſt. Nec minus turpes dedecus ſuum, quam honeſtos egregia delectant. *Sen. de Beat. Vit.*

And

And for the latter, we may prefer a ſhort and mirthful life to a much longer that is to paſs in ſerioufneſs and reflexion, in the conſtant endeavour to perfect ourſelves, and to do the utmoſt good we can in our ſituation ——we may chuſe to live but few years with the free indulgence of appetite, rather than many, that are to be the price of a conflict with our inclinations, of denying and mortifying them.

But whether ſuch à choice be made or not, it muſt be abſurd to conſider *that* as a ſufficient puniſhment for the moſt vicious, which is often the lot of the moſt virtuous; whoſe lives are, frequently, of as ſhort continuance as thoſe of the worſt of mankind.

Besides, we are not only to regard what is deſerved by us, when we alone are prejudic'd by abuſing our nature, we ſhould attend, likewiſe, to what we deſerve when that abuſe is greatly hurtful to others. On which particular as I ſhall, preſently, enlarge, I will now only add with reſpect to it, that when we are thus culpable, our puniſhment will properly come, and our due one can, often, only come from the common parent——

from

from him to whoſe creatures we are thus injurious——from him who implanted in us affections to which we muſt have done the greateſt violence, before ſuch an injury could have been our reproach, and who both diſpos'd us to, and qualify'd us for doing the *beſt* offices towards them, who have thus experienced our worſt.

SECTION III.

THIRDLY, In many caſes the Deity, inconteſtably, proves his diſpleaſure at our guilt, by the ſuffering he has made its immediate attendant *.

* ——Ea nimirum, quæcunque Acherunte profundo
Prodita ſunt eſſe, in vita ſunt omnia nobis.
——Tityos nobis hic eſt; in amore jacentem
Quem volucres lacerant; atque exeſt anxius angor;
Aut alia quavis ſcindunt cuppedine curæ. *Lucret.*

Τῶν πονηρῶν ὅσοι τὴν παραυτίκα πληγὴν ἐκφυγεῖν ἔδοξαν, ἐ μετὰ πλείονα χρόνον ἀλλ' ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ τιμωρίαν μακροτέραν ἢ βαδυτέραν τίνουσιν· ἐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι.

Οἱ πονηροὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀτορῶντες, τὰς ἡδονὰς μὲν εὐθὺς κενὴν χάριν ἐχέσης, ἐλπίδα ἔρημον εὑρίσκουσι, φόβων ἢ καὶ λυπῶν ἢ μνήμης ἀτερπεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ὑποψίας, ἀπιστίας ἢ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ γέμουσαν. *Plut. de his qui ſero, &c.*

A LEWD courſe is, often, long purſu'd before the pernicious effects of it are felt; but a ſingle act of Lewdneſs ſhall, ſometimes, bring on the moſt terrible of diſeaſes.

MANY acts of Intemperance may be our reproach before we become ſenſible how much hurt we have to apprehend from that vice; but one debauch ſhall be, ſometimes, inſtantly follow'd by a diſtreſs that attends us to our grave.

SOME crimes are no ſooner committed than they raiſe a general hatred of us *; and this muſt, neceſſarily, give us ſuch fears and ſuſpicions as will be our conſtant tormentors.

WHAT are great covetouſneſs, pride, ambition, but perpetual plagues to us, ever affording us grounds of uneaſineſs, and depriving us of all true enjoyment of ourſelves?

WE no ſooner give way to any of the fiercer paſſions, but we, that inſtant, find the inconvenience of it †; we are made, at

* Quæ (natio) ſuperbos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos non aſpernatur, non odit? *Tul. de Leg.*

† Θυμοὶ ——— ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν· Ἔνιοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσι. ——— *Ariſtot. Ethic.*

that

that very inſtant, in no ſmall degree ſufferers by it. We cannot be very angry,—we cannot reſent—we cannot hate—we cannot be intent on revenge, but a very great part of the uneaſineſs that we wiſh to give others falls, without delay, upon ourſelves; nay, we are, often, hereby made, directly, more wretched, than, perhaps, it ever proves in our power to make them, at whom we are moſt diſpleas'd.

Every perſon, who has been at all accuſtom'd to reflect, muſt be ſenſible how eaſily I might enlarge on this head *.

When, therefore, it is, in ſo many caſes, found that we ſcarce ſooner offend, than we ſuffer for it—that a fault is ſcarce ſooner committed by us, than it is puniſh'd—that our guilt has diſtreſs, as it were, accompanying it; we have the moſt certain proof

* He that will do any thing for his pleaſure, muſt engage himſelf to ſuffer all the pains annex'd to it; and theſe pains are the natural puniſhments of thoſe actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes to paſs, that intemperance is naturally puniſh'd with diſeaſes; raſhneſs, with miſchances; injuſtice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppreſſion; negligent government of Princes, with rebellion; and rebellion with ſlaughter, &c. *Hobbes of Commonwealth.*

 that

that God doth not overlook ſeveral of our crimes, we have his diſpleaſure at ſeveral of them in the cleareſt manner expreſs'd. If there are others that carry with them no ſuch immediate marks of his diſpleaſure, yet while they are greater than, or equal to, thoſe which he doth inſtantly puniſh, and, therefore, undeniably evidence himſelf offended at, we may well judge it probable that ſuch will, finally, have their deſert, whatever length of time paſs before they receive it.

THIS, indeed, muſt appear probable, in the higheſt degree, if we will allow it to be true, as I cannot but think it to be, what the beſt heathen writers have remark'd *, ——That

* Προσέταττε —— φυλάττειν ἑαυτόν. ζημίαν αἱρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κέρδος αἰσχρόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἅπαξ ἐλύπησε· τὸ δὲ διὰ παντός. *Vid. Dicta Chilonis apud Diog. Laert.*

Nihil eſt miſerius, quam animus hominis conſcius. *Plaut.*

Μεταμελείας οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. *Ariſtot. Eth.*

——Metus in vita pœnarum pro malefactis
Eſt inſignibus inſignis; ſceleriſque luela
Carcer; & horribilis de ſaxo jactu' deorſum;
Verbera; carnifices; robur; pix; lamina; tædæ:
Quæ tamen etſi abſunt; at mens ſibi conſcia facti,
Præmetuens, adhibet ſtimulos, torretque flagellis;

Nec

——That we cannot be guilty without ſome ſort of uneaſineſs, without condemning our-

Nec videt interea, qui terminus eſſe malorum
Poſſit; nec quæ ſit pœnarum denique finis:
Atque eadem metuit, magis hæc ne in morte graveſcant. *Lucr.* lib. 3.

Magna vis eſt conſcientiæ,——& magna in utramque partem: ut neque timeant, qui nihil commiſerint; & pœnam ſemper ante oculos verſari putent, qui peccârint. *Tul. pro Milon.*

Scelerum in homines, atque impietatum nulla expiatio eſt. Itaque pœnas luunt non tam judiciis———ut eos agitant, inſectanturque furiæ, non ardentibus tædis, ſicut in fabulis, ſed angore conſcientiæ, fraudiſque cruciatu. *Tul. de Leg.*

Conſentiamus (cum Epicuro) mala facinora conſcientia flagellari, & plurimum illi tormentorum eſſe, eo quod perpetua illam ſolicitudo urget ac verberat. *Sen. Ep.*

———Se
Judice nemo nocens abſolvitur. *Juv.*

———Cur tamen hos tu
Evaſiſſe putes, quos diri conſcia facti
Mens habet attonitos, & ſurdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum?
Pœna autem vehemens, ac multo ſævior illis,
Quas aut Cæditius gravis invenit aut Rhadamanthus,
Nocte dieque ſuum geſtare in pectore teſtem. *Juv.*

Nihil eſt tam occupatum, tam multiforme, tot ac tam variis affectibus conciſum atque laceratum, quam mala mens. Nam & cum inſidiatur, ſpe, curis, labore diſtringitur; & jam, cum ſceleris compos fuerit, ſolicitudine,

ourſelves for it. What can ſuch diſquiet and ſelf-condemnation be pronounced, but the ſuggeſtion of our very nature to us—— That the puniſhment any crime deſerves, it will, at laſt, certainly meet with?

I DO not ſuppoſe that they who have thus repreſented us as ſure to be diſſatisfied with ourſelves when acting a wrong part, did not apprehend us to be as capable of extinguiſhing our conſcience, as we are of extinguiſhing our ſhame, our pity, and almoſt our humanity itſelf. They expreſs'd themſelves in the manner they did, from the conſideration of us as *form'd* with a moral ſenſe, if I may ſo ſpeak; a ſenſe, I mean, how we ought to act in each material point of duty, and how juſtly we ſhould ſuffer if acting otherwiſe in it than we ought to do.

IT, undoubtedly, depends as much upon ourſelves how far this ſenſe ſhall be preſerv'd in us——how vigorouſly it ſhall affect us, as it doth how far our capacity, in general, ſhall be improv'd or exerted. By a wrong

pœnitentia, pœnarum omnium expectatione torquetur. *Quinc.*

Ἡ κακία τῶν κολασηρίων ἐσ' ἑαυτὴν ἕκασον ἐξ ἀυτῆς τελαίνεται, δεινή τις οὖσα βία δημιεργὸς οἰκήρε καὶ σὺν αἰσχύνη φόβες τε πολλὲς καὶ πάθη χαλεπὰ, καὶ μεταμελείας καὶ ταραχὰς ἀπαυσες ἔχονται. *Plut. de his qui ſero,* &c.

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education, or by the vices to which we deliberately abandon ourſelves, this ſenſe may be as much impair'd, as any of our outward ſenſes, or bodily organs, may be by our ſelf-indulgence and exceſs. Nor would it be leſs unfit, from the *impair'd ſtate* of the one to judge of its *natural*, than it would be to judge in the ſame way of the other.

I WILL only further obſerve with reſpect to the inward ſenſe of which I am here ſpeaking——That it has been not only aſſerted by them who the moſt carefully conſider'd, and were the beſt qualified to diſcern the nature of man, but——That it has manifeſted itſelf where human nature has been ſeen in its greateſt ſimplicity, has been leaſt diſguis'd and corrupted——That it has been acknowledg'd even by them who have reſiſted it, who have acted in direct oppoſition to it——That they who deſcribe themſelves as utter ſtrangers to it, have given into thoſe purſuits, which neceſſarily tended to ſuppreſs it, have induſtriouſly ſhunn'd whatever was likely to reſtore, have been intent on a ſucceſſion of engagements ſure to prevent its alarming them *.

* Ζητοῦσι οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν, &c. *Ariſtot. Eth.*

But whatever becomes of our ſelf-diſapprobation when we are guilty, and of the apprehenſions then entertain'd of puniſhment deſerv'd by us; it has been inconteſtably prov'd that our guilt doth, in many inſtances, make us ſevere ſufferers in the preſent life; and we certainly have from thence no ſlight ground to believe that the crimes for which we do not thus, at preſent, ſuffer, but for which we ought full as much to ſuffer, will have their deſert hereafter.

What univerſally miſguides our judgment on this point, is, That we do not behold thoſe ſufferings, which are connected with the crimes I have mention'd, as marks of God's diſpleaſure at them, nor under the notion of a puniſhment for them.

We think ſuch ſufferings deriv'd to us in a natural way, in a way that has nothing in it of divine interpoſition *.

But can the *Deity* give us clearer evidence that any action will offend *him*, than by repreſenting it to us as ſure to be to our hurt? Can *he* more plainly ſhew himſelf

* Τὸ μὴ παρ' ἕκαστον ἀδίκημα τοῖς πονηροῖς ἑπακολουθῶν κακὸν ἀλλ' ὕστερον, εἰς ἀτυχήμαθ' χώραν τιθέμενοι, χ) συμφορὰν ἀ τιμωρίαν ἀνομάζοντες, ἀθὲν ὠφελῶνται. *Plut. de his qui ſero*, &c.

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diſpleas'd with any practice, than by the miſchievous conſequences he has annex'd to it? And as our *faculties* are given us by him, the perceptions they afford muſt be *his* appointment: the notices we have from *them*, we have from *him* through them; when we learn from *them* what will hurt us, we learn it from *him:* Form'd likewiſe as we are by *Him* averſe to every thing hurtful to us, His making known to us what is to prove ſo, muſt be in order to our avoiding it; His will, therefore, is, that it ſhould be avoided; and every action that we perceive naturally productive of hurt to us is hereby plainly declar'd to be contrary to his will, and diſpleaſing to him.

The ſufferings that have a neceſſary connexion with any practice are to be regarded as a mark of its diſpleaſing God, ſince they flow from that conſtitution of things of which he is the author, and ſince his diſpleaſure cannot poſſibly be more plainly ſhewn than by the diſtreſs it inflicts.

If ſuch and ſuch evils are the *neceſſary* conſequences of ſuch and ſuch actions, they are made ſo by him——they are ſo according to the courſe of things He has eſtabliſh'd,

and, therefore, in the cleareſt manner expreſs his diſapprobation of thoſe actions. Theſe evils are to be look'd upon as a ſpecies of puniſhment inflicted by God, as they are, by his appointment, the conſequence of doing what he prohibits: For what is a puniſhment under any government, but the ſufferings it appoints for acting contrary to its Laws?

In human Governments, indeed, the puniſhment inflicted on the violation of their Laws, have not a neceſſary connexion with the actions by which ſuch Laws are violated, becauſe it is not in their power to eſtabliſh ſanctions of that kind. But as thoſe human Laws are moſt perfect which may be ſaid to execute themſelves, ſo the wiſdom of the divine Laws is in nothing more clearly ſeen, than in the good or bad effects inſeparable from obſerving or tranſgreſſing them *; which effects, by being in a natural way, cannot be leſs properly rewards or puniſh-

* Δίκην διδόασιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἣν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην διδόναι, οἱ μὲν, λανθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ, βιαζόμενοι.——————τὸ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν, βελτίονος ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. *Xenoph. de fac. & dic. Soc. &c.*

ments,

ments, than any advantages or ſufferings would be that were arbitrarily appointed by the Deity, ſince what comes to paſs in either way muſt be from his will, and muſt be alike an enforcement of his will.

But then, perhaps, it may be ſaid, if we are now puniſh'd for our faults, what can we have to fear hereafter on their account?

The anſwer may be,

First, That tho', in the conſtitution of things, all manner of vice may have its preſent inconvenience, as virtue has its immediate advantage; yet, in a diſorder'd ſtate of the world, as virtue may meet with terrible diſcouragements, ſo there may be ſuch encouragements to ſome ſorts of vice as ſhall greatly leſſen the preſent inconvenience to which they are naturally expos'd——ſhall occaſion it to be utterly diſregarded.

The vitious may be ſo numerous, may ſo countenance and imitate each other, may ſo ſucceſsfully bend their wits to leſſen the weight of the arguments againſt their practice, and to give it a ſpecious appearance—there may be ſuch neglect in the education of youth, their minds may be ſo corrupted by bad principles and bad examples, that they

they who are very guilty ſhall not find much uneaſineſs, ſhall have no great trouble from their conſcience, ſhall have but ſmall diſquiet from any thing they either feel or fear.

THE crimes by which we ſeek to make a fortune, tho' they may be *ſuch* precedents * ——may excite and ſeem to juſtify *ſuch* diſpoſitions towards us——may countenance and encourage *ſuch* attempts upon us, *as*, in prudence, ought to alarm us†; yet the proſpect of the enjoyments in reſerve for us when our fortune is made ſhall ſo animate us——the numbers we are acquainted with, who have ſucceeded in the very way in which we are proceeding, ſhall ſo fix our attention, ſo keep up our ſpirits——and the wealth at length acquir'd ſhall be able ſo to gratify our predominant paſſions, ſhall procure for us ſuch a ſucceſſion of amuſements and diverſions, that from the time of our ſetting out in its purſuit, to the inſtant of our being taken from the world, all thoſe

* Mala exempla recidunt in auctores. *Sen.*

† Inde fere ſcelerum cauſæ, nec plura venena
Miſcuit, aut ferro graſſatur ſæpius ullum
Humanæ mentis vitium, quam ſæva cupido
Indomiti cenſus. *Juv.*

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diſcouragements to our thus enriching ourſelves which the nature of things furniſhes, ſhall have been very little heeded by us; the whole of the uneaſineſs compar'd with the whole of the ſatisfaction we have had from our conduct, ſhall have been thought quite trifling, and what we could not but deſpiſe. And when this is the caſe, which, we are certain, frequently is,——when many feel and fear ſo little from their iniquity, are ſo little diſquieted by their crimes, while others experience a much lower degree of guilt ſorely diſtreſſing them; the obvious reaſoning is this——If *leſſer offences* are, conſtantly, accompanied with evident tokens of the divine diſpleaſure——If there is no committing them without being, in the preſent life, ſevere ſufferers from them; the impunity in which ſome go on in *much greater offences* can only be for a ſeaſon: The accidents that now prevent ſuch perſons from receiving any part of their deſert are but of ſhort continuance, and then, the Deity's diſpleaſure will as fully manifeſt itſelf in the *puniſhment* of the more grievous offender, as it is now ſeen in that of the leſs criminal.

SECONDLY, When the *diſtreſs* brought on us in this life by our vices is greateſt—when it is extreamly ſevere, it may be by no means an adequate puniſhment of them, it may bear no proportion to what they deſerve. *It* is often rather a warning to others what they ſhould avoid, and to the guilty perſon what he may hereafter fear, than, in any wiſe, the juſt deſert of his crimes.

LET it be conſider'd, what miſchief the lewd and the intemperate do by their example, by thoſe they corrupt, or countenance, and thus harden, in their vices—— what prejudice the affairs of a whole community ſuſtain from a number of ſuch members of it, or even from a very few when they are in ſuperior ſtations——how far the hurt they do their own conſtitutions affects thoſe of their lateſt poſterity, enfeebles and diſorders all their deſcendents, a numerous race! nor doth leſs hurt to the minds of theſe than to their bodies: Be this, I ſay, conſider'd, and we ſhall not fail to acknowledge, that the *preſent* ſmart, which the faults of ſuch offenders bring on them, is not the whole that they ought to feel——the whole that ought to be inflicted on them, as the deli-

deliberate authors of ſuch extenſive miſchief, as not to be reſtrain'd from doing it, even by the hurt that they were ſure would come upon themſelves while they were doing it.

SECTION IV.

FOURTHLY, There are many obvious reaſons why the *full* puniſhment deſerv'd by the guilty ſhould not be immediately inflicted. To inflict it immediately would ſuit

NEITHER the goodneſs of God,

NOR the nature he has given us,

NOR the ſtate in which he has plac'd us.

FIRST, The ſpeedy puniſhment of our guilt, to the full of what it deſerves, would by no means ſuit the divine goodneſs. It ſurely would be the exceſs of ſeverity towards us, to allow us no time for ſecond thoughts—to give us no opportunity of recollecting ourſelves—to cruſh us, the very moment that we might according to ſtrict juſtice thus ſuffer. The Deity, governing us in this manner, could not be otherwiſe than

than the object of our dread and averſion: He could not be conſider'd otherwiſe than as exerciſing over us a rigour moſt unſuitable to an all-perfect nature. Whatever the *goodneſs* of *God* ought to be conceiv'd; and admitting the common apprehenſion of it, as reſembling that eaſineſs and flexibility of temper which in each other we call good-nature, to be groſsly injurious to it; yet while we may with certainty pronounce that his *goodneſs* muſt do more for us than could be our expectation from ſtrict juſtice, we muſt thence be induc'd to conclude that it will ſhew the offender all the forbearance, which is fit and reaſonable to be ſhewn him ——which is agreeable to a wiſe government *——which conſiſts with a proper diſtinction between the virtuous and vitious, and ſuits the well-being of the whole ſyſtem of intelligent creatures.

SECONDLY, Our nature, our frame is ſuch, as muſt lead us to think that its author would not let each offence be ſpeedily attended with its deſerv'd puniſhment.

* Nemo dubitabit, quin, ſi nocntes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo modo poſſint, ſicut poſſe interdum conceditur, ſalvos eſſe eos magis e republica ſit, quam puniri. *Quin. Inſt. Or.*

We are ſo conſtituted, that we only come by degrees, and in length of time, to a thorough ſenſe of our duty. And when we have that ſenſe, we cannot, at once, act up to it——we cannot, immediately, controul the diſpoſitions in us to violate it: This is ſcarce poſſible for us to do, til their wrong turn has been repeatedly experienc'd *.

Wisdom is to be acquir'd by none of us but from years and much obſervation. In that part of life in which we the moſt frequently offend, we have not receiv'd all that aſſiſtance towards the diſcharge of our duty, which our very conſtitution will hereafter afford us †. We bring with us into the world quite different tempers; and as ſome

* Peccavimus omnes: alii gravia, alii leviora, alii ex deſtinato, alii forte impulſi, aut aliena nequitia ablati: alii in bonis conſiliis parum fortiter ſtetimus, & innocentiam inviti ac renitentes perdidimus. Nec delinquimus tantum, ſed uſque ad extremum ævi delinquimus. Etiam ſi quis tam bene purgavit animum, ut nihil obturbare eum amplius poſſit ac fallere, ad innocentiam tamen peccando pervenit. *Sen. de Clem.*

† Nam velut infirmo pueri, teneroque vagantur
Corpore; ſic animi ſequitur ſententia tenuis.
Inde ubi robuſtis adolevit viribus ætas;
Conſilium quoque majus, & auctior eſt animi vis.
Lucret.

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are *born* with tendencies, that have very little in them to correct; many are ſo with inclinations, the depravity of which tho' it be their ſincere endeavour, their utmoſt care to reform, they yet cannot do it, til after a very conſiderable part of their life is paſt—til they have ſuffer'd much from ſuch inclinations, and in numerous inſtances lamented their unhappy force.

BOTH how early we ſhall obtain a ſenſe of our duty, and how eaſy we ſhall find the practice of our duty, depends entirely upon others—upon them who have the care of our education. If their folly, by giving way to ours, by indulging all the cravings of that part of life, in which we are utterly incapable of directing ourſelves, has ſtrengthen'd our paſſions, and ſubjected us to our appetites—If it has fill'd our heads with wrong notions of things, taught us to value what we ought to deſpiſe, and to neglect what we ought moſt to regard *; it will

* Senſus noſtros non parens, non nutrix, non magiſter, non poeta, non ſcena depravat, non multitudinis conſenſus abducit a vero. Animis omnes tenduntur inſidiæ, vel ab iis, quos modo enumeravi, qui teneros, & rudes cum acceperunt, inficiunt, & flectunt, ut volunt: vel, &c. *Tul. de Leg.*

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coſt us infinite pains, in our future life, to undo the miſchief hereby occaſion'd. Many faults muſt, in our riper age, be neceſſarily the conſequence of having had ſuch an education; and many years muſt neceſſarily paſs, before our reaſon, with the beſt uſe we can make of it, will have the power over us, which we the moſt earneſtly wiſh it to have.

FURTHER, that temper of mind, which, under the proper convictions that maturer years bring with them, is the fitteſt to carry us to an eminent degree of virtue, is, in our youth, our greateſt ſnare, and apt to betray us into meaſures extreamly blamable*. Thus form'd, therefore, thus conſtituted as we are, nothing can appear more fitting and reaſonable, than that each offence ſhould not be ſpeedily puniſh'd——than that a reſpite ſhould, when the eſtabliſh'd order of things

* Οὐθὲν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν, οὐδὲ ἀργεῖ δι' ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ δραστήριον, ἀλλ' ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρονται, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν. ——— ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις, ὧν ἡμεῖς μὲν εὐθὺς τὸ τραχὺ καὶ νύττον οὐ φέροντες, ἀποκόπτειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν καὶ κολούειν· ὁ δὲ βελτίων κριτὴς, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐνορῶν τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ γενναῖον περιμένει λόγου καὶ ἀρετῆς συνεργὸν ἡλικίαν καὶ ὥραν, ᾗ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις καρπὸν ἀποδίδωσι. *Plut. de his qui ſero*, &c.

permitted it, be often vouchſafed us—than that we ſhould, in ſuch a caſe, be often ſpar'd, have time given us, and be allow'd to obtain from age and reflection whatever benefit they are capable of yielding us *.

A FORBEARANCE of this nature we are, likewiſe, induc'd to expect, by conſidering,

THIRDLY, *our preſent ſtate*, as a ſtate of trial.

FROM this view of our condition on earth we may eaſily account for any delay the Deity may uſe, in puniſhing us as our crimes deſerve. This world is not the place in which we are to receive our deſerts. Our Guilt is here no more to expect its adequate puniſhment, than our Virtue its due reward. We are now but acting our ſeveral parts; it is, when they are finiſh'd, that we fitly receive the applauſe or cenſure to which our care or negligence in them entitles us. There would not be a proper

* Magna pars hominum eſt, quæ reverti ad innocentiam poſſit. *Sen.*

——————Mediocribus, & queis
Ignoſcas, vitiis tentor. Fortaſſis & iſtinc
Largiter abſtulerit longa ætas, liber amicus,
Conſilium proprium. *Hor. Sat.*

trial

trial of us, if we were always kept in awe by a certainty that the very inſtant we became obnoxious to divine juſtice, we ſhould feel its ſeverity. What uſe we would make of our reaſon could not be foreſeen under ſuch a conſtant reſtraint upon us, under the dread of ſuch impending ſufferings. What reward could that obedience expect, which was only paid from the diſtreſs that was in view the moment we offended? That the preſent life is a ſtate of trial in order to a future, muſt, I ſhould think, appear highly probable,

FIRST, from the diſproportion that our enjoyments bear to our faculties.

IT is an obſervation we meet with in *Tully*, and it ſeems a very juſt one *, *That we ſhould judge of the nature of any ſpecies from the beſt, or the moſt perfect of it.* In the caſe before us we need not go ſo far—— we need not inquire what the beſt, the wiſeſt of mankind have determin'd on the ſeveral purſuits that engage us, what they have pronounc'd on the delights that here offer themſelves.

* Quid illud? num dubitas, quin ſpecimen naturæ capi deceat ex optima quaque natura? *Tul. Tuſc. Quæſ.*

A VERY moderate underſtanding—any manner of attention, thought and reflection ſuffices to inſtruct us, how little comfort all the pleaſures of ſenſe afford, how vain it is to ſeek among them for what will fully ſatisfy us.

WITHOUT us there is nothing with which we can long be pleas'd *; and in the exerciſe of our internal powers we muſt ſtill regard the weakneſs of our outward frame—by this the nobleſt operations of our underſtanding muſt be regulated, and we muſt conſult our body, how far we ſhall allow ourſelves in the entertainment of our mind.

NOTHING is more commendable in us than the love of truth, nor have we a more diſtinguiſhing ornament than the principle that excites us to it; and yet great earneſtneſs in the ſearch after truth would, neceſſarily, have for its conſequence exhauſted ſpirits, an enfeebled conſtitution, decay, diſeaſe, untimely death. How diſpos'd ſoever we are to reaſonable purſuits, and how well ſoever fitted for them, near half of our life muſt paſs in eating and ſleeping: we muſt

* Omnibus in rebus, voluptatibus maximis faſtidium finitimum eſt. *Tul. de Orat.*

be

be thus on a level with the brutes for half our life, that in the other part of it we may not be prejudic'd by rational enquiries. Men of the beſt underſtanding muſt daily trifle, muſt deſcend to quite childiſh amuſements, in order to *preſerve* that very underſtanding *, to have the freer and longer uſe of it.

What it is that makes us moſt happy, was a queſtion, in determining which the ableſt heads were imploy'd, but never agreed. And their diſagreement herein ſeems as full a proof as can be deſir'd, that all the ſchemes of happineſs we here propoſe to ourſelves have their defects——that there is a Good of which we want not the notion, but cannot, in our preſent ſtate, attain the enjoyment. In ſuch circumſtances, it appears moſt reaſonable to look beyond the grave for the happineſs that ſuits our nature; and if there alone it is to be found, nothing can be aſſerted more likely than that we are ſent here to qualify ourſelves for it—to practice

* Cito rumpes arcum, ſemper ſi tenſum habueris;
At ſi laxâris, quum voles, erit utilis.
Sic ludus animo debet aliquando dari,
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat ſibi. *Phæd.*

that virtue of which it will be the proper reward.

THAT we are now in a ſtate of trial may,

SECONDLY, be collected from the effects that the oppoſition of the principles in our frame produces—the taſk it impoſes—the difficulties it occaſions us.

WE are at conſtant war with ourſelves*.

* Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει· ὅτι ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν, καὶ ξυμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μήποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν.——————ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. *Plat. Phæd.*

Ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. *Ibid.*

Ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. *Ariſt. Eth.*

Ἐπὶ τῶν μερέων τᾶς ψυχᾶς δύο τὰ πρῶτα, τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. *Metop. Pythag. apud Stob.*

Hanc pugnam contentionemque partis animæ rationalis cum irrationali & contra, Platonici agnoſcunt, ſed aliter quam Stoici. Animam enim cum anima rixari & altercari illi volunt, rationis expertem cum ratione prædita. Hi vero in una eademque animæ ſubſtantia illud certamen rationis & appetituum rationi adverſantium fieri pertendunt. Galenus lib. 5. De Dogmate Hippocratis & Platonis: ἡ μὲν ἄλογος ἐν ἡμῖν δύναμις ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἕλκει τὸ δεόμενον· ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἀντισπᾷ καὶ κατέχει τὴν οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ φορὰν, καὶ μάχη γε πολλάκις ἑκατέρων ἰσχυρὰ γίγνεται πρὸς ἄλληλα, φανερῶς ἐνδεικνυμένη, διττὴν εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν στασιαζουσῶν ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεων. *Salmaſ. in Epic.*

Quid eſt hoc, Lucili, quod nos alio tendentes, alio trahit? *Sen. Ep.*

There

There is a perpetual ſtrife and conflict within us. Reaſon and Appetite are always at variance, ſuggeſting to us quite contrary meaſures; each is intent on leſſening the others influence over us. What would be moſt agreeable to me, if I were to follow my ſenſual *Inclination*, *Reaſon* repreſents as moſt dangerous; and the path into which the latter would invite me, as the ſafeſt and moſt pleaſant that I can take, the former bids me regard as doubtful where it will lead, and certain to diſguſt and fatigue me.

LET a right education have given the virtuous principle in us all the ſtrength that it could thence receive, and let our own after-care herein correſpond to that which was taken by our wiſe inſtructors; we ſtill ſhall have our appetites frequently alarming us, and giving us abundant proof that it is only great caution which can be our ſecurity ——that if we would paſs any part of our life unhurt by *them*, we can only promiſe ourſelves this from the guard we keep, and the diſcipline we obſerve throughout our life.

EVERY one's conſcience is on the ſide of his duty*: by which I mean, that when

* Hoc habent inter cætera boni mores; placent ſibi. *Sen. Ep.* 47.

we allow ourſelves time for conſideration—when we fairly and impartially conſider how it will be beſt for us to act, we always determine in favour of our duty, we always judge according to what reaſon and religion direct. Yet the judgment thus made by us all, how few does it influence in their manners! We have ſcarce ſooner paſs'd it, than we act contrary to it.

THE difficulty there is in the practice of virtue *, I don't now ſpeak of that which ariſes from the bad examples ſet us—from the arts us'd by the immoral to corrupt us—from the ſubſerviency of guilt to a preſent intereſt, or from any outward temptation; but, I ſay, the difficulty there is in the practice of virtue barely from what our own *hearts* ſuggeſt—from the oppoſition *within us* to it, has been remark'd by the wiſe and good in every age, by them from whom ſuch a complaint would have been leaſt expected. If then, each has, in his own breaſt, the greateſt enemy to his peace, and

* Ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν μὲ ἀληθίως γενέϑ, χαλεπὸν, χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τελέϑγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγυ τετυγμένον. *Simon. ap. Plat.*

Τὸ Πιτθακὸ ἰδία περιεφέρετο τῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιάζόμενον ὑπὸ τ σοφῶν, τὸ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. *Pit. ap. Plat.*

we

we cannot be unhurt but by being always attentive, always watchful——If, when every temptation without us is at a diſtance, we are ſtill tempting ourſelves, and in no ſmall danger from our own affections *—If, with the fulleſt and cleareſt knowledge of what is right, we are by no means ſecure of not acting contrary to it, and can only preſerve ourſelves from doing ſo by careful reflection, by much thought and conſideration——If, after all the pains we can take to remove our prejudices, to clear our diſcernment, and obtain a juſt view of our true intereſt, we ſtill ſhall have a hard taſk to hinder our being diverted from its purſuit †—If virtue, as amiable and engaging as it can appear to us, will yet be, in many inſtances, not practic'd but by ſtruggling with and denying ourſelves ‖;

* Hac conditione nati ſumus, animalia obnoxia non paucioribus animi quam corporis morbis. *Sen.*

† Ὥσπερ ἂν μέλιτταν ὁρῶμεν ἐφ' ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐλαττώματα καθιζάνουσαν, ἀφ' ἑκάστου δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα λαμβάνουσαν· οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τὰς παιδείας ὀρεγομένους, μηδενὸς μὲν ἀπείρως ἔχειν, πανταχόθεν δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα συλλέγειν. μόλις γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ ταύτης τὰς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς φύσεως ἁμαρτίας ἐκκρατήσειεν. *Iſocr. ad Nicoc.*

‖ Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
Ἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐπ' αὐτήν,
Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον. *Heſiod. de Op. & Di.*

the

the inference ſeems natural—we are appointed to ſuch perpetual conflict, we have our warineſs and circumſpection ſo continually call'd for, and a right conduct made a taſk of ſo much labour and pain, that we may approve our worth, and, acting as we ought in ſo difficult a ſtation, have our recompence in that change of Being which takes place at our death.

When God has implanted in us a ſtrong ſenſe and approbation of what is right, which yet has by no means a neceſſary influence upon our practice, and is only brought to influence it by much reflection and a conſtant guard upon ourſelves—When our Reaſon acts ſo much leſs forcibly upon us, than the Inſtinct of Brutes does upon them, and we are ſo capable of reſiſting the cleareſt evidence of our duty and ſo prone to do it *, we muſt, I ſhould think, be led to regard the diſcipline and application thus requir'd from us, as the preparation and qualification for a ſtate of that quiet, repoſe,

* Ad deteriora faciles ſumus: quia nec dux poteſt, nec comes deeſſe: & res etiam ipſa ſine duce, ſine comite procedit: non pronum eſt iter tantum ad vitia, ſed præceps. *Sen. Ep.*

and

and full enjoyment of ourſelves, which is here deny'd us *.

WERE the preſent life our only one—— Were we ſent into this world to be as eaſy in it as we could be, and then to diſappear for ever; for what end could the right part we have to act in it be ſo difficult and toilſome? For what end ſhould the ſnares to our well-being lye ſo thick about us? For what purpoſe ſhould we have within us ſuch an enemy to our preſent peace—inclinations ſo perpetually urging us to our undoing, urging us to enjoy life by ſhortning it, and to make thoſe things our chief purſuit, which are our ſure deſtruction?

THE proviſion there is for the wants of every creature upon earth, and the large ſupply we ſee mankind vouchſafed not only of what concerns their ſubſiſtence, but, likewiſe, of what ſerves their convenience, is, to all, a moſt obvious proof of the goodneſs of the common parent, and of ſuch good-

* Non temerè, nec fortuitò ſati, & creati ſumus, ſed profectò fuit quædam vis, quæ generi conſuleret humano: nec id gigneret, aut aleret, quod, cùm exanclaviſſet omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum ſempiternum: portum potiùs paratum nobis, & perfugium putemus. *Tul. Tuſc. Quæſ.*

neſs

neſs from which leſs could not be expected, ſuppoſing we had nothing to look for beyond the grave, than that we ſhould have it in our power to paſs our ſhort life in eaſe and quiet—that there ſhould be no ſuch hindrances to this as we could not remove. But allowing that we are plac'd in this world as Candidates for happineſs in another—that we are to obtain an eternal reward by well acquitting ourſelves in the taſk appointed us, we, then, know how to account for the difficulty there is in bringing ourſelves to act as we ought—we know how to reconcile all the ſelf-denial that a virtuous practice muſt coſt us, with the utmoſt kindneſs and goodneſs towards us in our Creator——we ſee plainly why the courſe we have to run ſhould require ſuch exact management of ourſelves, why it ſhould keep us in ſuch conſtant exerciſe, ſhould oblige us to ſo ſevere a diſcipline, to ſo much caution and care. We are put to no trouble for which we have not the ampleſt recompence, and which we would not make our choice while it could be ſo recompenc'd. The prize is worthy of all the pains we can be at to gain it: nor can we conſider a thing ſo deſirable as ever

likely

likely to be obtain'd by us, without at the ſame time conſidering ſome ſort of deſert in us as requir'd towards obtaining it—ſome extraordinary care as qualifying us for it.

THIRDLY, we ſeem warranted to pronounce our preſent ſtate to be a ſtate of trial, from the ſufferings in it which are, often, the lot of the very beſt of mankind*.

THAT ſuch are, frequently, ſufferers, and even very ſevere ones, is not the remark only of this or that age, but as it is every where obſerv'd by *Us*, ſo has it been, as far as we can trace, the remark of all times and nations. But that He who is ſtrictly attentive to the will of his Creator—who would in no inſtance, deliberately, act contrary to it—who ſeriouſly conſiders for what end he was made, what faculties he has given him, how they may be properly applied, and who ſincerely endeavours to purſue the end of his creation, and to make the proper uſe of his faculties; that one thus

* Multa incommoda juſtis viris accidunt. *Sen.*

Quid ſibi quiſque nunc ſperet, cum videat peſſima optimos pati? *Id.*

Creberrima triſtia in bonos. *Tac. An.*

Dies deficiat, ſi velim numerare quibus bonis malè evenerit. *Tul. de Nat. Deor.*

acting

acting ſhould have the greater part of his exiſtence, or a very large part of it neceſſarily uneaſy and burthenſome to him, is what we cannot believe a juſt Governour of the univerſe would permit.

THE caſe is much harder, if the trouble thus undergone was brought upon the ſufferer by that ſtrict regard to his duty from which he hop'd to obtain his maker's favour*. For, aſſuredly, when we do our beſt to pleaſe God, tho' it may not give us any abſolute claim to a reward, yet is his juſtice concern'd to hinder its being hurtful to us; and nothing could reflect more on the divine juſtice, than that any ſhould be, upon the whole, in a worſe condition for their integrity—in a worſe condition for their endeavour to have their practice ſuch as their maker would approve. And this likewiſe is matter of frequent obſervation; it is frequently ſeen that the ſtrictly conſcientious

* Ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ, διὰ δὲ τὸ Θεῷ λατρεῖαν. *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

It is abſurd to think, that, by the conſtitution of nature and will of its author, any being ſhould be finally miſerable only for conforming himſelf to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. *Religion of Nat. delin.*

and

and virtuous do not only loſe, by their being ſo, many advantages, but that, further, they thereby ſubject themſelves to many inconveniences. A ſteady adherence to their duty has coſt *ſeveral* their lives *, and *more* have experienc'd it the utter ruin of their fortunes. From which what can be inferr'd, if the world be under any wiſe government, and numerous are the proofs of its being under the very wiſeſt, but that now we are to exerciſe our virtue, and to expect its reward hereafter——that we are in this life to entitle ourſelves to happineſs, and to enjoy it in a future †?

* Τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐὰν περ αἱρῇ, ὁ Μέλητος ἢ ὁ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνήσεται· ἀδύνατον γάρ. οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐδὲ θέμις εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἐξὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκτεῖναι ἢ ἐξελάσαι ἢ ἀτιμῶσαι, ἃ ἴσως οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς οἴονται μεγάλα εἶναι κακά, ἃ δὲ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἃ οὗτος νῦν ἐπιτηδεύει. *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

Οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται, ἔτε ὑμῖν ἔτε ἄλλῳ ἀδυνὶ πλήθει γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος, καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ ἀνόσια ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖόν ἔστι τὸν ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν. *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

† Εἷς ἔστιν λόγος ὁ τῶν Θεῶν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον ἂν ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιρεῖσθαι θάτερον. ἔστι δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν, μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἔστι καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας. ἀγωνίζεσθαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὰς καλὰ τὸν βίον· ὅταν δὲ διαγωνίσηται, τότε τυγχάνειν τῶν προσηκόντων. *Plut. de his qui ſero, &c.*

FOURTHLY,

FOURTHLY, that our preſent manner of exiſtence is a ſtate of trial, may be inferr'd from the peculiar ſatisfaction we feel when we properly acquit ourſelves in what is regarded as our trial.

THAT courſe of action, which a ſerious, impartial conſideration of things directs us to, and which has our entire approbation both when we are engag'd in it, and when we reflect upon it, we cannot but believe to be a right one, and ſuch as is agreeable to him who qualified us thus to act. If we meet with many diſcouragements to this courſe, with many obſtacles to it from our fellow-creatures—with much oppoſition to it from our own lower faculties, and with many difficulties in it, and yet have theſe only increaſing the ſatisfaction of our perſeverance; we hereby plainly ſhew ourſelves foreboding what our recompence will at length be—we expreſs a ſenſe, implanted as it were in us, of a reward, that our acting a reaſonable part, will, finally, procure us. There is undeniably a ſelf-applauſe, an approbation of and delight in ourſelves, whenever we have reſiſted a temptation to depart from what is right; and the more we reflect,

ſo

ſo much the more confirm'd we become in this *approbation*, ſo much the ſtronger it grows. Nor have we this approbation only when the wrong action avoided would have brought us into any immediate difficulty—when, if it had not been avoided, it would have ſoon ſome way or other diſtreſs'd us. No, it is even when the wrong action would, if comply'd with, have been of preſent benefit to us, and, perhaps, of ſervice to us throughout our continuance on earth. The delight ariſing from the temptation ſo withſtood is, often, when our withſtanding it can have in view no recompence on this ſide the grave *——when all the merit thereof muſt have its reward beyond the grave. We are pleas'd when we adhere to our duty, tho' by our doing ſo we loſe our friends—we multiply our enemies—we forego all hopes of advancing our fortune—we greatly prejudice our fortune, and paſs our whole term on earth in ſtrait circumſtances, or in no very comfortable ones. This, perhaps, you will ſay, is, among *us*, from the influ-

* Quis, vir modo, & erectus ad honeſta, non eſt laboris appetens juſti, & ad officia cum periculo promptus? *Sen.*

ence of the Chriſtian doctrine, and, therefore, no proof how we are naturally affected, which alone is to be conſider'd in the preſent argument. But that, in the inſtance before us, men are, by the deductions of natural reaſon, affected in the manner here repreſented, is evident both from the hiſtorical and the moral writings of antiquity. The former deſcribe the ableſt, the wiſeſt and worthieſt of mankind ſuffering nothing to enter into competition with their duty *— pleas'd that they had diſcharg'd it, whatever ſufferings they had thereby incurr'd, tho' depriv'd of what was, in common repute, the greateſt bleſſing of life, or tho' they were to ſuſtain, on that account, the loſs of life

* Omitto pericula, labores, dolorem etiam, quem optimus quiſque pro patria, & pro ſuis ſuſcipit, ut non modo nullam captet, ſed etiam prætereat omnes voluptates; dolores denique quoſvis ſuſcipere malit, quam deſerere ullam officii partem. *Tull. de Fin.*

Ἐγὼ μὲν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μοι μὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔλαττον ὡς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ ὅτε Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις, καὶ κινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν. τῷ δὲ Θεῷ τάττοντος (ὡς ἐγὼ ὠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον) φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, λείπομι τὴν τάξιν. πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι, ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν, *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

it-

itſelf *. And as for the latter, the moral writings of the heathen ſages, they ſpeak of a good conſcience as the beſt ſupport, the greateſt comfort we can have †—they adviſe to do that which is right whatever inconveniences may attend it ‡; and how rough

* Quid fortes viri? Voluptatumne calculis ſubductis, prælium ineunt, ſanguinem pro Patria profundunt?—— Contineo me ab exemplis. Græcis hoc modicum eſt: Leonidas, Epaminondas, tres aliqui, aut quatuor.—ſi noſtros colligere cepero,——dies me deficiet. *Tul. de Fin.*

Quid in hac republica tot, tantoſque viros ob rempublicam interfectos, cogitâſſe arbitramur? *Tul. Tuſc. Qu.*

Ἀκούσατέ δή μου τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ὑμῖν ἂν ἐγὼ ὑπείκοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον. *Plat. Apol. Soc.*

† Τὰς δὴ λύσεις οὕς ἐν πρόσθεν ἔλεγον, ἃ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκλαλῶν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν· ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον: *Plat. Crit.*

Fateor me communium malorum conſolationem nullam invenire, præter illam, quæ tamen, ſi poſſis eam ſuſcipere, maxima eſt——Conſcientiam rectæ voluntatis, maximam conſolationem eſſe rerum incommodarum: nec eſſe ullum magnum malum, præter culpam. *Tul. Epiſ.*

‡ Μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιῶ, μήτε τὸ ζῆν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν, πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου. *Plat. Crit.*

——————Ambiguæ ſi quando citabere teſtis
Incertæque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut ſis
Falſus, & admoto dictet perjuria tauro,
Summum crede nefas animam præferre pudori,
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere cauſas. *Juv.*

ſoever the path of virtue may be, to continue, nevertheleſs, in it, and purſue it as the only way to happineſs.

When, therefore, the courſe of action that we are conſider'd as requir'd to perſevere in, notwithſtanding all the temptations we can be under to quit it, is ſuch as has the fulleſt approbation of our beſt inform'd judgment —when our perſeverance in that courſe is conſtantly reflected on with pleaſure, and gives us ſo much greater pleaſure as our temptations to a contrary practice have been more preſſing, I ſee not what can be hence more properly collected, than That all ſuch temptations are the teſt how far a regard to what is right influences us——that our preſent buſineſs is to perſiſt in a virtuous practice, and by withſtanding all the allurements of vice to qualify ourſelves for a ſuitable reward in that ſtate into which we paſs at our death.

Fifthly, It ſeems probable that we are here in a ſtate of trial, ſince, after we come to the uſe of our reaſon, there is no part of our life but what does afford matter of trial; we can be in no ſituation, in which our virtue is not brought to the teſt, and in which we

we are not call'd upon to approve how far we have our duty at heart.

In our youth how violent are the ſolicitations of appetite——what the fierceneſs of our paſſions——how ſtrong our bent to the pleaſures of ſenſe *! Our manhood has indeed leſs tumultuous paſſions, and leſs a turn to riot and exceſs; but then it has, likewiſe, leſs candour and ingenuity, leſs ſenſe of honour and ſhame; we are more diſpos'd in it to ſelfiſhneſs and inſincerity, to tricking and fraudulent arts. Old age, in the ſame way, exempts us from wrong tendencies of one kind, only to bring on thoſe of another; it impairs our compaſſion and benevolence, our courage and generoſity; it inclines us to be peeviſh and froward, querulous and cenſo-

* Imberbis juvenis, tandem cuſtode remoto,
Gaudet equis, canibuſque, & aprici gramine campi;
Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus aſper,
Utilium tardus proviſor, prodigus æris,
Sublimis, cupiduſque, & amata relinquere pernix.
Converſis ſtudiis, ætas animuſque virilis
Quærit opes.——————
Multa ſenem circumveniunt incommoda——
Quærit, & inventis miſer abſtinet, ac timet uti;
——————————————————
——————————————————
Difficilis, querulus. *Horat.*

rious. In every relation we ſuſtain, we ſtand expos'd to ſome failure or other on its account; we are liable to act contrary to our duty. Every way of life, in which we can engage, puts our virtue to the hazard—proves how far it is our concern to act the part becoming us. Each ſtation in which we can be plac'd adminiſters occaſions and opportunities of behaving unfitly and blamably, or properly and commendably.

Our various tempers are but ſo many different trials what the ſtrength or weakneſs is of the virtuous principle within us—what our deſire is to acquit ourſelves of our obligations. The moſt praiſe-worthy diſpoſitions we can poſſeſs, border ſo near on what is defective and faulty, and require ſo much circumſpection, ſo much watchfulneſs in us towards our avoiding the fault to which they approach, that even they may be regarded as putting our ſincerity to the teſt, as manifeſting our greater or leſs concern to fulfil the will of our Creator. Thus when mankind, in every ſituation in which they can be view'd, appear tempted and try'd, we may well believe, that we are, by our perſeverance while thus tempted, to entitle

title ourſelves to that prize which will be beſtow'd when our courſe is finiſh'd——we are now to approve our obedience, and to receive hereafter its recompence.

WHAT has been alledg'd to render it probable that our preſent life is a ſtate of trial——that we are *here* in our paſſage to *another world*, and that on our behaviour *here* it depends what our condition ſhall *there* be, will receive a ſtrong confirmation by conſidering,

SIXTHLY, the trial made of us in ſome parts of our preſent ſtate, with regard to other parts of it; or the connexion there is *now* between our behaviour in ſome parts of our life, and the advantages and diſadvantages that accrue to us in other parts thereof.

THE conſideration of this will ſhew us, that nothing is affirm'd of our condition hereafter being affected by the manner in which we now employ ourſelves, but what is exemplified, and has, in ſome meaſure, its truth aſcertain'd by what is matter of daily obſervation, by what is continually before our eyes.

OUR younger years paſs in the trial of us, as to the diſpoſitions we ſhall acquire——the habits we ſhall form——the improvement we

ſhall make of our abilities—the accompliſh-ments we ſhall receive—the activity and ſtrength of body we ſhall poſſeſs—the de-gree of health we ſhall afterwards enjoy—the length that our lives ſhall have—the fi-gure we ſhall bear in the world—the better or worſe condition of our future ſubſiſtence. We are all fully ſenſible that youth is the time for correcting whatever is amiſs in our temper and inclinations—that if they are then neglected, if the depravity of them is then encourag'd, or not carefully reſtrain'd, there is very little, or rather no hope of their amendment in our future life: they, cer-tainly, after ſuch favour and connivance, never are amended in the far greateſt part of mankind, and in none with any thing near the eaſe with which they would have been, had the endeavour to correct them begun earlier. So let our younger years be ſpent in ſelf-indulgence, in irregular and vitious courſes; bad habits are ſure to be acquir'd, which afterwards are very rarely ſubdu'd, and never but with extream difficulty. If we are arriv'd at manhood without having at all apply'd ourſelves, addicted in our former age to idleneſs or low amuſements, to taking

our

our pleaſure, or conſulting our repoſe; we uſually go on in the ſame way to the end of our days, averſe to the culture of our reaſon, to all liberal purſuits; or if we afterwards engage in them, we make but a very ſmall proficiency in compariſon of what we ſhould otherwiſe have done, and make that ſmall one with twice the pains that it would have coſt us, had it been ſooner attempted.

A FEW years, at our ſetting out in the world, paſs'd in exceſs and debauchery, are either the entire ruin of a conſtitution that might have been long preſerv'd ſound and vigorous, or ſo weaken it, that no ſkill and care can, afterwards, give us any conſiderable reſpite from uneaſineſs and pain. To the ſame cauſe ſhall be owing ſuch a decay in our intellectual powers, as is never after recoverable by any the utmoſt regularity we can uſe.

THUS likewiſe, with regard to our fortune. The wrong ſteps of our youth—the follies of which we were then guilty—the expences we then run into, are, often, never after to be retriev'd by us, but bring us for the whole of our remaining life into narrow and mean circumſtances.

We ſometimes indeed have it in our power to remedy, in our maturer years, the inconveniences that have accrued from miſconduct in our earlier; but it is, certainly, often not in our power——and we often do not avail ourſelves of the power we have; we are hinder'd from it by the bad influence that our paſt miſbehaviour has upon us—— and when the ability we retain is exerted, the unhappy effects of our former errours ſhew themſelves by the trouble it gives us to act, in any way, contrary to what we have been accuſtom'd to.

When we have reach'd the middle of life, our trial ſtill proceeds: We then are, I grant, in leſs danger of entering into wrong meaſures, if we have hitherto been taking right ones—if the age we have paſs'd has been confirming us in thoſe manners which are moſt for our well-being; but tho' the danger of this be *leſſen'd*, it is by no means wholly *remov'd*. None of us want to be told, that there are many, who, acting throughout a commendable part till their reaſon had attain'd its full ſtrength, have then gone the utmoſt lengths of indiſcretion, and depriv'd themſelves, in a very ſhort time,

time, of the ſeveral advantages that the prudence of all their former years had been providing for them.

THE older we grow, and the longer we have continu'd in the purſuit of our true intereſt, we are ſtill ſo much the leſs likely, while our faculties are unimpair'd, to act contrary to it; but when our underſtanding has had every help—when we have had all the benefit that experience, obſervation and reflection can yield us, we are ſtill capable of hurting ourſelves, and are ſtill found doing it *: We are, frequently, fools *in* our old age, when we are not made ſo *by* age. We do *then* things which make our term either ſhorter, or much leſs ſupportable and eaſy to us, than it would otherwiſe have been.

THE good, indeed, that will enſue from a *right practice*, is not, in all reſpects, quite ſo certain as the hurt that will accrue to us from a wrong one. Notwithſtanding our greateſt care we may have bad health, a ſhort life, a ſtrait fortune; but we are,

* Ἐξεπιτηδὲς χλώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμῖν οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. *Plat. Gorg.*

never-

nevertheleſs, to conſider the former care we take as, even here, preventing things from being worſe; we are to conſider, that if the advantages we want could have been procur'd, it muſt have been by our care, they never could have been obtain'd without it; nor are they long continu'd to any of us, but from what we do in order to their being ſo. At leaſt there are irregularities, the avoiding of which is neceſſary towards preſerving any conſtitution, or any fortune. In the moſt material inſtances, the effects of our care are anſwerable to it, we certainly obtain from it the advantages we ſeek, and they can be no other way obtain'd by us.

SEE then the connexion there is between our ſtates in this and in another world thus plainly mark'd out, by what paſſes in the ſeveral periods of our *preſent life*——by the dependence that our happineſs or miſery in one part of this life, has on our right or wrong behaviour in another part of it!

AND perhaps it will make the deeper impreſſion upon us, if ſome of the more remarkable particulars, in the correſpondence here referr'd to, are pointed out.

OUR

Our happineſs in each ſtate alike depends on the diſpoſitions we cultivate. It is full as neceſſary that we ſhould correct our wrong ones in order to our preſent well-being, as in order to our well-being hereafter.

Many inconveniences muſt be ſubmitted to—much ſelf-denial muſt be us'd to qualify ourſelves for happineſs beyond the grave; and it is evident, that by far the greateſt part of mankind can no otherwiſe procure themſelves a bare maintenance than by the reſtraints they undergo, by mortifying themſelves in numerous inſtances. Nor are any of us in ſuch a ſituation, wherein our more durable ſatisfactions muſt not be purchas'd by denying ourſelves ſuch as are of ſhorter continuance—wherein our greater good is not obtain'd by foregoing a leſſer.

If that virtue, which alone gives us hope in our death, coſts us much trouble to attain——if thoſe moral acquiſitions with which our happineſs hereafter is connected cannot be made without much application, and great pains; neither can we without great pains and application make any progreſs in ſcience——gain a proper ſkill in any pro-

profeſſion——be expert even in the uſefuller trades.

ALL the care requiſite for thoſe moral improvements, that are to have their reward in a future ſtate, is no more than what correſponds to the care we muſt take in order to thoſe improvements which are for our preſent benefit.

SOME find the diſcharge of their duty much eaſier than others do; and it is the very ſame with whatever can profit us while we are on earth; there is a wide difference in the trouble that different perſons muſt be at to obtain it.

SOME have repeated warnings to amend themſelves, much time, and many opportunities for it. Others are ſpeedily cut off in their crimes, are ſcarce ſooner plung'd into guilt, than Death puts a reformation out of their power. Thus likewiſe is it with our temporal concerns; the miſchief we do ourſelves in theſe comes on ſometimes very ſlowly——makes ſuch gradual advances, that we have full leiſure to conſider how the courſe we take muſt end, to ſtop, and to retrieve ourſelves; but often we are undone before we are aware of it; our fortune or

conſti-

conſtitution is, as it were in an inſtant, ruin'd irretrievably. One act of imprudence ſhall have the ſame effect as to this world, that one act of guilt ſhall have as to the other world.

THE longer we have purſu'd *wiſe meaſures* in the management of our affairs, the more eaſy it is to perſiſt therein, and the leſs probable it is that we ſhall alter them; but that we may depart from them is every where ſadly experienc'd. So with regard to our morals, the longer they have been incorrupt, the leſs danger there is of a change in them; but danger there will be, while we are upon earth; we are here always expos'd to temptation, and always in danger of falling by it.

I WILL run the compariſon no farther than to three particulars, which well deſerve our moſt ſerious conſideration.

THERE is the ſame inclination in us to do the things that hurt our temporal eſtate, as there is in us to do the things that hurt our eternal; we are as prone to act contrary to our intereſt in *this world*, as we are to act the part that will prejudice us in the *other*.

It ſeems full as improbable to us in our younger years, that the exceſſes in which we then allow ourſelves will, at length, have the pleaſure they give us abundantly overpaid by the pains and diſeaſes they will bring on us; as it can ſeem, that we have any puniſhment to fear after death for the guilt that we have, in the whole of our term here, contracted.

Lastly, how unreaſonably and vainly we may hope for mercy and favour when we are call'd out of the world, we find clearly exemplified by the groundleſs and vain hopes we entertain with reſpect to our condition in it. We are ever perſuading ourſelves, that ſomething or other will happen to prevent our being ſufferers by thoſe very courſes, which we do not find any one perſon purſuing without their making him a ſufferer.

The ſtate of trial in which we thus appear to be at preſent, muſt induce us to conſider the full and adequate puniſhment of the guilty, as properly delay'd til this ſtate is come to its period. And that it ſhould be delay'd, muſt, likewiſe, ſeem reaſonable, from the intereſt of the bad and good being here

here ſo mix'd, that the due puniſhment of the one might occaſion the other the ſevereſt diſtreſs.

A PRINCE may be a very wicked man, and yet his life be of ſuch conſequence to the virtuous part of his ſubjects, that it cannot but be their devouteſt wiſh to have it ſpar'd. The loſs of him would throw a whole nation into the utmoſt confuſion and diſtraction.

ON the proſperity of a very guilty parent that of a numerous and well-diſpos'd family may depend; his calamities would be ſhar'd by them who ſtood thus related to him; his ruin would be their common one.

FURTHER, as to reſtrain guilt is, undeniably, a principal end of divine puniſhment, it may, often, ſo happen, that by delaying this puniſhment that end ſhall be moſt effectually ſerv'd.

AND thus it will be, when the criminal having us'd every method that could promiſe him ſecurity——having taken ſuch precautions that all danger from his crimes ſeem'd quite remote; his ruin, nevertheleſs, comes when it could be leaſt expected, and comes by thoſe means which every obſerver

will be diſpos'd to conſider as remarkably evidencing the interpoſition of providence *. Here, while the goodneſs of the Deity is fully approv'd, and the offender has ſufficient time for conſidering in what he is engag'd, and what muſt be its conſequences; yet the juſtice of God at length takes place in ſuch a manner, as ſtrikes a general awe——as ſhews how vain the craftieſt ſchemes are, that would exempt *Guilt* from fear, that would give it any hope of ſafety.

Most wiſe it, alſo, may be, to defer inflicting the ſufferings we deſerve, in order that the natural connexion there is between guilt and miſery may more plainly appear, and the world thereby be taught that God does not act arbitrarily—that by the very conſtitution of things our crimes are hurtful to us. And this becomes manifeſt, when we are permitted to go on in our crimes til they are their own puniſhment—til the miſchief they naturally produce is felt by us, and occaſions us a diſtreſs infinitely overbalancing any pleaſure that we ever receiv'd from them.

* Τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ καὶ τρόπῳ προσήκοντι γίνεσθαι τὰς τιμωρίας, ὑ βέλτιον εἶναι τῦ ταχὺ καὶ παραχρῆμα νομίζειν. *Plut. de his qui ſero*, &c.

I WILL

I WILL only add, that it is no ſlight diſſuaſive from guilt to obſerve the extent of its hurt——to learn not only what the miſchief is that we do ourſelves by our vices, but how much we have to fear from them whoſe crimes we imitate or countenance, how much one criminal has to fear from another *. We are taught this important leſſon, when the puniſhment of the guilty is delay'd til it is inflicted by ſuch as are as bad as themſelves——when the criminal, proſpering for ſome time, receives at length from the wickedneſs of others the juſt deſert of his own. For inſtances of which, Hiſtory need not be appeal'd to, as the experience of moſt of us furniſhes them.

THUS much for the reaſons that may be aſſign'd, why vice does not inſtantly feel the effects of the Deity's diſpleaſure.

* Ἐνίοις ἀμέλει καὶ κολάσεις ἑτέρων πονηρῶν, οἷον δημοκοίνοις, ἀπεχρήσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, *Plut. de his qui ſero*, &c.

SECTION V.

A FIFTH remark proper to be made on the preſent ſubject, is, That God has in this world afforded a great variety of proofs, how wrong it is to think that we ſhall wholly eſcape the vengeance which is ſlow in coming upon us—how long puniſhment may be delay'd, and yet be, finally, inflicted.

WHAT are moſt of the diſeaſes, which we owe to our vices, but admonitions of this kind——ſo many admonitions, that what, at preſent, gives us no pain or uneaſineſs, but rather great ſatisfaction and delight, may, at length, ſadly diſtreſs us, occaſion us the moſt torturing ſufferings? We may for years go on, pleaſing our palate, conſulting what is moſt agreeable to it, denying it nothing that it can reliſh; and this ſelf-indulgence be found not at all miſchievous to us —neither impairing our ſtrength, nor leſſening our activity, nor diſturbing our reſt. But, if an untimely death prevent it not, the dreadful ſcene is ſure finally to diſcloſe itſelf: we find no ſort of food that our ſtomach can bear in a quantity proper for our due nouriſhment——what we think likelieſt to raiſe our appetite, is no ſooner ſet before us, than

than we either quite nauſeate it, or barely taſte it——Diſorders ſeize us, that Art may relieve, but is utterly unable to remove; and with all the relief that Art can procure, we are ſure to experience frequent returns of the moſt acute pains, and have the melancholy proſpect of theſe returns becoming more frequent the older we grow, and the leſs able we are to ſupport ourſelves under them.

So again, for a conſiderable time no bad effect attends the freer uſe of the ſpirituous draught: many gay hours are owing to it: year after year we regard it as wholly productive of pleaſantry and mirth. The fatal day comes at laſt, that convinces us what complicated miſery we had been all this while preparing for ourſelves——what ſhort intervals of eaſe we are to expect for the remainder of our life.

It is the very ſame with the gratification of luſt. At firſt, all the repreſentations of *any miſchief* that can enſue from it are utterly deſpis'd. We do not ſoon find any, and therefore cannot perſuade ourſelves that we have any to fear. Some years often paſs before the ſad truth is known to us——before we experience how dear we pay for the ſhort pleaſure, by the dreadful and laſting calamities that are its conſequence.

A LIKE obſervation may be made on the hurt that our *minds* receive from our *miſconduct*; it operates ſlowly, the bad effects thereof are long in diſcovering themſelves. By very inſenſible degrees it is that idleneſs indiſpoſes us to make any progreſs in uſeful knowledge, and injures our capacity for it. Thoſe prejudices which ſo obſtruct our diſcernment——which fix us in ignorance and error——which will not ſuffer us to receive the information that is of the utmoſt importance to us, gain not their ſtrength in a ſhort ſpace: a conſiderable part of our life paſſes before they have this unhappy aſcendency—before we can be thus attach'd to our miſtakes.

IN our *childhood* we judge nothing more deſirable, than that our inclinations ſhould be uncontroul'd, and our paſſions have their ſcope; the inconveniences ariſing from this ſeem, in the beginning, ſo quite trifling, as to deſerve no manner of notice: they increaſe, indeed, as we grow older, but ſo increaſe, that their removal is fully depended upon, when manhood and experience are attain'd; and then, alas! we neither know how to bear, nor how to remove them——we lament it as a ſad miſhap that our paſſions

ſions are ſo ungovernable, but having given way ſo long to them, we ſee ſuch numerous difficulties in the attempt to ſubdue them, that we conclude it would be utterly fruitleſs and vain.

ALL the habits we contract, the influence of which is moſt grievous to us, are the work of time, and none of them are at firſt ever conſider'd as likely to do us the miſchief that they afterwards occaſion.

THAT the divine juſtice does not leſs certainly puniſh, becauſe it does ſo leſs ſpeedily, is, further, evident from the effects of vice upon common-wealths, upon kingdoms and empires. The moſt powerful ſtate is ſure to be hurt by the vices of its members; and, as theſe vices ſpread and increaſe, is ſure to be ruin'd by them. Hiſtory informs us that this always has been the caſe; and that it cannot be otherwiſe, the reaſon of things will teach us. But how imperceptibly does this ruin come on! Two or three centuries paſs before it is compleated. There is a neceſſary connexion between *it* and its *cauſes*, which is as fully underſtood as the conſequence of any practice whatſoever; yet ſo ſlowly do theſe operate, they are ſo very long in producing their effect, that, when it is juſt

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ſhewing itſelf, it, ſometimes, is not apprehended near, even by them who are beſt qualified to diſcern it, and who are moſt intereſted in the diſcovery of it.

But nothing, perhaps, will more clearly prove the folly of hoping that the puniſhment which is delay'd will be wholly eſcap'd, than to conſider how very rarely the full good or evil enſuing from any part of our conduct in this world immediately takes place.

As we are not at once either very good or very bad——as our wiſdom has its gradual improvement, and leſſer faults prepare us for, and lead us to much greater; ſo is it with the conſequences both of a right and wrong practice: they are not inſtantly what they will prove to be——they are not at once as beneficial or as hurtful as they will be experienc'd. It is by degrees they open themſelves. Any inſtance of wiſdom and diſcretion, beſides its obtaining the end that we immediately propos'd to ourſelves from it, diſpoſes us to ſome further action equally diſcreet——contributes to improve us in wiſdom——is ſure to give ſatisfaction to us as often as we reflect upon it, and, being regarded as a part of that behaviour from the whole

whole of which we are eſteem'd wiſe and prudent, and thereby obtain many and great advantages, muſt be regarded as, in part, deriving to us thoſe advantages. So for a fooliſh and blamable *action*; whatever the miſchief be which *it* does us inſtantly, *it* is naturally connected with ſome other folly *, carries us on to it, confirms and augments the wrong tendency in us——our review of *it* in a ſober ſerious minute is unpleaſant and irkſome——and as *it* is one of the many extravagancies that make us, upon the whole, fooliſh, bad men; it has, accordingly, its ſhare in whatever we ſuffer as ſuch.

EVERY bad man is, it muſt be granted, ready enough to enumerate the faulty things he has done, that have never met with what could be call'd a puniſhment in any way equal to their demerit; but then it ſhould be remark'd, how frequently this ſeeming delay of an *adequate* puniſhment has been their *encreaſing* puniſhment, by

* ——— ———Quis
Peccandi finem poſuit ſibi? Quando recepit
Ejectum ſemel attritâ de fronte ruborem?
Quiſnam hominum eſt, quem tu contentum videris uno
Flagitio? *Juv.*

being

being an inducement to ſuch a repetition of them, as has, at length, brought on ſufferings quite inſupportable.

I HAVE only to add on this head, that by the Heathens themſelves it has been obſerv'd, how ſeldom the guilty were, even in this life, without receiving ſome part of their deſert, tho' they might paſs many years ſecure and proſperous.

When Heav'n's revenge is ſlow,
It but prepares to ſtrike the fiercer blow.*
Il. l. 4. 160, 1.

* Οὔ τοι προσελθοῦσ' ἡ Δίκη σε, μὴ τρέσῃς,
Παίσει πρὸς ἧπαρ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων βροτῶν
Τὸν ἄδικον, ἀλλὰ σιγᾷ καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ
Στείχουσα, μάρψῃ τοὺς κακοὺς ὅταν τύχῃ.
Plut. de his qui ſero, &c.

Raro antecedentem ſceleſtum
Deſeruit pede pœna claudo. *Horat.*

Lento gradu ad vindictam ſui divina procedit ira; tarditatemque ſupplicii gravitate compenſat. *Val. Max.*

Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi, ex uſu vitæ eſt; pœnaſque maleficiis aliquando ſeras——nunquam autem irritas eſſe. *Plin.*

F I N I S.